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society as a whole, in preference to those that serve only 
the selfish interests of individuals. PME shows how such 
intelligent and ethical behaviour can be programmed using 
extensions of existing logic programming techniques and 
implementations.
PME includes an extensive survey of research on 
machine ethics, and investigates a number of examples 
that have been studied in the ethics literature, including 
the classic trolley problem: A runaway trolley is headed 
straight for five people walking on a railway track, with no 
means of escape. A railwayman, observing the situation 
from a distance, can throw a switch to divert the train onto 
a side track. However, there is a single man standing on the 
side track, who also has no means of escape. Is it morally 
permissible for the railwayman to throw the switch? Most 
people in psychological experiments and professional ethi-
cists alike agree that it is.
Killing one person to save five people can be justified by 
utilitarian considerations. But what about the situation in 
which there is no side track, and there is a bystander stand-
ing on a bridge next to a heavy man. Is it morally permissi-
ble for the bystander to push the heavy man onto the track, 
if it is guaranteed to stop the train and save the five men on 
the track? Most people agree that it is not, and that in gen-
eral the end does not justify the means.
The distinction between the two situations exemplified 
by the trolley problem has been described in the literature 
as being due to the Doctrine of Double Effect, attributed to 
Thomas Aquinas. According to the Doctrine, an action that 
causes harm is permissible if the harm is a mere side-effect 
of bringing about a good result, and it is not permissible if 
the harm is an intended means of bringing about the same 
good result. Giving a computational and logical interpreta-
tion to such notions as intended means and mere side-effect 
is what PME is largely about.
Self-driving vehicles, robotic warriors, and autonomous 
machines of all kinds are on our doorstep. Soon they may 
be making decisions, with or without our having any say, 
about who will live and who will die. How those decisions 
are made, whether we can understand them, and whether 
we can argue with them, will be important considerations 
determining whether or not these technological advances 
will be to our human advantage.
Much of the progress in AI that underpins these devel-
opments has been made using statistical and deep learning 
techniques, trained on huge amounts of data, vastly larger 
than those encountered in ordinary human experience. 
These techniques have the potential, therefore, to greatly 
outperform human decision making procedures. But they 
come at the price of their not being able to explain their 
decisions using concepts that ordinary people can under-
stand. Moreover, they bypass not only rule-based and 
logic-based approaches in AI, but also traditional studies 
of human decision making in psychology, economics and 
philosophy.
This is where Programming Machine Ethics (PME) pre-
sents an alternative, combining traditional approaches to 
decision making with logic-based AI techniques. In PME, 
intelligent behaviour is obtained by using logic, both to 
generate alternative plans of actions and to derive their 
likely consequences, and by using preferences to choose 
among alternative plans of actions, using such criteria as 
the expected utility of the resulting state of affairs. Ethi-
cal behaviour is obtained by choosing plans that benefit 
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The computational logic of PME builds upon the use 
of clauses of the logical form conclusion if conditions, to 
relate goals that match the conclusion of the clause to sub-
goals corresponding to the conditions, which may include 
actions as a special case. It builds upon the distinction 
between using clauses top-down, to deliberately reduce 
goals to subgoals, and using them bottom-up, to derive log-
ical conclusions of the conditions.
For example, the railwayman in the trolley problem uses 
the clause:
You save five people if you divert the train onto the 
side track.
top-down, to reduce the top-level goal of saving the five 
men on the track to the subgoal of diverting the train onto 
the side track. The subgoal itself is morally neutral, but it 
has the undesirable side effect:
You kill one person if you divert the train onto the 
side track.
In contrast, the bystander uses the two clauses:
You save five people if you stop the train.
You stop the train if you push a heavy person in front 
of the train.
top-down, to reduce the same top-level goal to the subgoal 
of pushing the heavy person in front of the train. But now 
the subgoal is not morally neutral. It involves the use of an 
action that is morally undesirable in and of itself, with the 
foreseeable consequence that the heavy person will inevita-
bly be killed.
The computational logic of PME is a variant of abduc-
tive logic programming (ALP), which also employs, 
in addition to “closed” predicates defined by means of 
clauses, “open” predicates used for making assumptions. In 
ordinary abduction, the top-level goal represents observa-
tions, and the assumptions represent candidate explanations 
of the observations. In applications to moral reasoning, the 
assumptions represent candidate actions.
Assumptions in ALP, like updates to a database, need to 
satisfy integrity constraints. In moral reasoning, integrity 
constraints can be used to represent such morally absolute 
principles as thou shall not intentionally kill.
In ALP, there can be many alternative candidate solutions 
that satisfy the integrity constraints. In applications of ALP to 
explaining observations, it is desirable to choose a candidate 
that is a best explanation. In deciding on a plan of actions, it 
is desirable to choose a candidate that accomplishes the most 
good. In both cases, the choice can be made by reasoning bot-
tom-up to derive the consequences of the alternatives, and by 
evaluating and comparing their desirability.
In this way, PME argues that ALP is able to accommo-
date both deontological principles in the form of integrity 
constraints, and utilitarian judgements in terms of prefer-
ences between alternatives. PME also argues that the two 
kinds of moral judgements, deontological and utilitarian, 
mirror respectively reactive and deliberative thinking in 
dual-process models of human thinking. Reactive thinking 
is fast, automatic and unconscious. Deliberative thinking is 
slow, controlled and conscious.
In the dual-process model, the two kinds of thinking are 
complementary, and interact in various ways. For example, 
in some cases, reactive thinking quickly proposes solutions 
to problems as they arise, whereas deliberative thinking 
monitors the quality of those solutions if time allows. In 
other cases, deliberative thinking generates solutions, and 
packages them for later reactive use. PME models such lat-
ter cases by the use of tabling in Prolog systems such as 
XSB.
PME covers a vast range of material, from the very phil-
osophical to the nitty gritty engineering detail. It includes 
such topics as the use of counter-factual reasoning to deter-
mine individual responsibility for actions (would the same 
effect have been obtained if the action had not been per-
formed?). It also includes the use of probability to reason 
with uncertainty, and the use of evolutionary game theory 
to study the emergence of norms and co-operation in popu-
lations of individuals.
To cater for the wide variety of readers who will benefit 
from reading the book, the authors have provided a number 
of alternative reading paths.
The focus in PME is on applications of computational 
logic to morality, employing both existing techniques, such 
as ALP, and new ones, such as tabled contextual abduc-
tion and counterfactual reasoning. Like ALP, the new tech-
niques have broader applications. Moreover, they have been 
the subject of numerous journal and conference publica-
tions by the authors, testifying to the originality and techni-
cal quality of the work.
PME draws upon a huge range of relevant work in phi-
losophy, psychology, artificial intelligence and other dis-
ciplines, giving that work both computational and logical 
interpretations, and realising it by means of well-crafted 
computer implementations. The book fulfils an important 
need at a time when computers are interposing themselves 
into every aspect of our human lives. There is nothing else 
like it, and it needs to reach a wide audience.
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